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Background: To bring down its high maternal mortality ratio, Burkina Faso adopted a national health policy in
2007 that designed to boost the assisted delivery rate and improving quality of emergency obstetrical and neonatal
care. The cost of transportation from health centres to district hospitals is paid by the policy. The worst-off are
exempted from all fees.
Methods: The objectives of this paper are to analyze perceptions of this policy by health workers, assess how this
health policy was implemented at the district level, identify difficulties faced during implementation, and highlight
interactional factors that have an influence on the implementation process. A multiple site case study was
conducted at 6 health centres in the district of Djibo in Burkina Faso. The following sources of data were used: 1)
district documents (n = 23); 2) key interviews with district health managers (n = 10), health workers (n = 16),
traditional birth attendants (n = 7), and community management committees (n = 11); 3) non-participant
observations in health centres; 4) focus groups in communities (n = 62); 5) a feedback session on the findings with
20 health staff members.
Results: All the activities were implemented as planned except for completely subsidizing the worst-off, and some
activities such as surveys for patients and the quality assurance service team aiming to improve quality of care.
District health managers and health workers perceived difficulties in implementing this policy because of the lack of
clarity on some topics in the guidelines. Entering the data into an electronic database and the long delay in
reimbursing transportation costs were the principal challenges perceived by implementers. Interactional factors
such as relations between providers and patients and between health workers and communities were raised. These
factors have an influence on the implementation process. Strained relations between the groups involved may
reduce the effectiveness of the policy.
Conclusions: Implementation analysis in the context of improving financial access to health care in African
countries is still scarce, especially at the micro level. The strained relations of the providers with patients and the
communities may have an influence on the implementation process and on the effects of this health policy.
Therefore, power relations between actors of the health system and the community should be taken into
consideration. More studies are needed to better understand the influence of power relations on the
implementation process in low-income countries.
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Improving access to skilled attendance childbirth
remains a major public-health challenge in Africa [1,2].
A set of factors has been identified as barriers to health-
care access: sociocultural factors, perceived benefits and
needs, physical and financial accessibility [3,4]. Financial
limitations were noticed as an important barrier to ac-
cess to maternal health care [3].In the context of achiev-
ing the Millennium Development Goals, African
countries have engaged in political actions to minimize
this factor by eliminating user fees.
User fees were seen as an effective solution for funding
improved primary health care [4,5]. More than two dec-
ades after the implementation of user fees, the objective
of improving access to primary health care has still not
been achieved; in fact, they are now considered a major
barrier to accessing health services. In this context,
many countries have decided to eliminate user fees. The
literature documenting these policies has focused mainly
on effects [6]. However, few articles have been found fo-
cusing on the modalities of implementation [6]. Six
issues surrounding the implementation process of re-
moving user fees were raised: the importance of having
sufficient funding, maintaining adequate drug stocks,
and involving front-line workers in the decision-making
process [6]. Providing incentive measures was seen as
essential to improve staff morale [7,8]. Improving com-
munication strategies to inform the general population
was identified as one of the key points in the implemen-
tation process [9,10]. Finally, improving the provider-
patient relationship was considered a key influence on
the implementation process and its effectiveness [9].
In a literature review analyzing health policies in low-
and middle-income countries, Erasmus and Gilson
(2008) indicated that this area of research “remains in its
infancy” [11]. Yet analysis of the implementation process
at the micro level is essential to highlight factors that
can counteract or facilitate the implementation of the
intervention [12-19]. However, this issue in the context
of improving financial access to maternal health care has
received little attention in the literature to date [11].
This paper presents an implementation evaluation of a
national maternal health policy that aims to subsidize
the cost of deliveries and emergency obstetric care in a
district of Burkina Faso. Two evaluations were carried
out on the implementation of this national health policy.
There are previous reports of short-term analyses that
identified weaknesses in this implementation, but they
do not document in detail interactions between partici-
pants at the micro level that may have an influence on
the effects of this policy [20,21]. In order to explore the
issues in greater depth, the objective of this paper is to
analyze the perceptions of this health policy by health
workers and the implementation of this policy at thedistrict level, and also highlight interactional factors that
have an influence on the implementation process.
Intervention background
Burkina Faso is a West African country with 16 million
inhabitants (World Bank, 2010). The maternal mortality
ratio is estimated at 560 maternal deaths per 100.000 live
births (WHO, 2008). Health system is composed of two
levels. The first level is the health centres (CSPS) which
cover several villages. A team of health workers (two
nurses and a skilled birth attendant) manage this level of
care. They provide basic outpatient, inpatient curative
and preventive care, including vaccinations and ante-
natal care. They also provide basic emergency obstetric
care (EMOC), which includes antibiotics, oxytocics and
convulsants, manual removal of the placenta, assisted
vaginal delivery and newborn care [22-24].
Health workers receive bonuses based on their medical
activities. They are entitled to 20% of medical consulta-
tions and actions per patient [25]. According to a study
published in 2009, the net salary of nurses with less than
5 years experience working in the public sector is esti-
mated at 110.409 CFA (168 Euro) (median amount) [25].
Community management committees (COGES), which
are elected by the population, are responsible for the fi-
nancial management of these health centres. They are
responsible for the revenues generated from user fees
(for curative care, hospitalization) and from subsidies for
delivery and emergency obstetric care. The second level
is the district hospitals (CMA), which are located in
towns. They serve the population of the entire district
and all emergency cases from CSPS. There is a surgery
department in the district hospital and a blood transfu-
sion service. This level provides comprehensive emer-
gency obstetric care, which means all the basic
emergency obstetric care plus caesarean sections and
care to sick and low birth weight newborn [22-24]. The
third level of the health system is the regional hospitals.
Traditional birth attendants (TBAs) performed deliver-
ies until 2007 [26]. Today, their role is to help women to
reach a health centre. However, they still perform deliv-
eries in some villages that are far from a health centre.
In some health centres, they are invited to participate in-
formally in activities (e.g. increasing awareness, cleaning
the delivery room). In some health centres, they receive
a bonus fee. In the context of maternal health services,
TBAs and community health workers play the same in-
formal role (helping women to reach a health centre to
give birth, increasing awareness). However, TBAs are
more inclined to perform deliveries.
Intervention
Figure 1 summarizes the process by which this policy aims to
increase the rate of assisted delivery by acting on economic
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Figure 1 Logic model of the national subsidy of obstetric care.
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intended objectives and goals that this policy aims to reach.
The subsidy policy targets pregnant women. This health
policy was approved by the council of ministers in April
2006. It consists of subsidizing 60% to 80% of the cost
associated with assisted deliveries and emergency obstetric
care depending on the level of care. Women pay the re-
mainder [22]. For example, for an uncomplicated delivery
at a health centre, women have to pay 900 CFA (1.4 Euro).
For the worst-off, the policy provides a full exemption.
However, the management mechanism to deal with this
population group has yet to be defined.
For caesareans and emergency obstetric care, the pol-
icy supports the cost of transportation from the health
centre to the district hospital. Women are fully
exempted from this cost. At the district level, financial
resources allocated by the central level for the cost of
transportation are managed independently from subsid-
ies for deliveries and emergency obstetric care.
Financial resources are directly allocated to health dis-
tricts. District health managers carry out resource alloca-
tion for health centres by giving them a bank check
from their financial institution. The amount given is
based on the volume of services provided to the target
population. These resources reimburse the cost of drugs
and supplies used for deliveries. Health centres are reim-
bursed up to 3600 CFA (5.5 Euro) for each uncompli-
cated delivery performed, and up to 14.400 CFA (22
Euro) for each dystocic labour. The main source of fund-
ing is the state budget.Method
Multiple case studies were conducted between Novem-
ber 2010 and February 2011 in six health centres in the
district of Djibo, located in the province of Soum in Bur-
kina Faso. This district was chosen because it is part of a
larger research program on the effect of the elimination
of user fees at point of service on the use of health ser-
vices [27]. In this research program, the district of Djibo
was used as a control district, since only the national
subsidy of obstetric care was applied (no intervention of
NGOs freeing up health care). Therefore, the data qual-
ity of the HIS (Health Information System) of the MoH
(Ministry of Health) was verified and due to the context
of the program (national policy implementation without
NGO support), the district of Djibo was chosen to con-
duct the study. Health centres were selected based on a
list of criteria’s including geographic accessibility and
localization, social and cultural environment, type of
health centre (isolated clinic, maternity), health atten-
dants (presence or absence of skilled childbirth attend-
ant), and rates of curative consultations, prenatal and
assisted deliveries [28].
The data sources described in Table 1 (documents,
interviews, focus groups, observations and feedback ses-
sion on the results) were used to boost the validity of
this study through triangulation [29].
Individual interviews and focus groups
Four categories of participants (district health managers,
health workers, TBAs and members of (COGES) that
Table 1 Methods and sources of data
Methods Sources of Data Sample size Variables examined
In Depth
interviews
Perceptions of the policy (content,
implementation, effects)
History of the implementation; challenges and
difficulties information communication, process of
funding, relation between stakeholders, quality of care






Patients, Communities (men; CHW,
TBA)
62 (8 to 10 persons for each focus
group)
Partograph, audits of maternal deaths, costs associated
with childbirth (formal and informal payments) barriers
to access to health care, quality of care
Documents Maternal deaths audits, guidelines,
register of birth, sheet management,
ethnography of the locality
21 audits of maternal deaths 1
guideline registers of birth from 6
health center from 2007 to 2010
Causes of maternal deaths, delays, distance between
health centres and district hospital, timing of the
ambulance, components of the health policy, process
of funding, tasks and responsibilities of each actor,
number of births in health centres2 ethnography of the locality
Observations Curative and prenatal consultations,
assisted deliveries, vaccinations,
distribution of nets
Observations were carried out in 6
health centres (from 7 to 10 days
were spent in each health centre)
Interaction between health workers and communities
(patients, communities, CHWs, TBAs)
COGES: Community management committee; TBA: Traditional birth attendants; CHW: Community health workers.
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tion process were interviewed [12]. The aim of these
interviews was to understand their perceptions of the
national policy and the history of challenges associated
with the implementation process. All interviews were
recorded. The first author and a local assistant con-
ducted the interviews and focus groups. Topics covered
in the interviews are listed in Table 1. Notes were taken
for each interview. For each health centre, health
personnel, the COGES and the TBAs from different vil-
lages covered by the health centres were interviewed. In
total, 16 interviews were carried out with health work-
ers, 10 with district health managers, 11 with COGES
members and 7 with TBAs (Table 1).
The interviews with TBAs and communities were con-
ducted in the local language (Fulfulde) and then trans-
lated into French. Two local translators translated
independently in order to ensure that the unstructured
guide was accurately translated.
Focus groups were organized to document the percep-
tion of this new healthcare policy, amounts paid for de-
livery costs, coping strategies to pay for medical costs
and transportation, availability of information about this
policy, and perceptions of quality of care at the health
centre. In total, 62 focus groups were conducted with
communities in villages. All the principal villages cov-
ered by the six health centres were targeted for focus
groups. This represents between 5 and 15 villages per
health centre. Women and men were met separately so
that they would feel more comfortable talking about ma-
ternal health. Focus groups were formed to include indi-
viduals who had used maternal health services during
the implementation of the policy and individuals who
had lived in the village for several years in order toobtain a wide range of perspectives on quality of care
provided by their health centre. Community health
workers were asked to gather a group of 8 to 10 women
and 8 to 10 men in the villages. Men and women were
gathered in the public square of the village. The selec-
tion process involved gathering participants who share
common characteristics (people who live in villages,
agriculture and husbandry as main economic activities)
in relation to the topic (the national subsidy of obstetric
care). The objective of the selection was to mix opinions
in order to highlight points of view on this national sub-
sidy of obstetric care and relations with the health
centre.
Community health workers and traditional birth atten-
dants were not systematically present during the focus
groups. However, data do not show any difference when
they were present or absent. We made sure that all par-
ticipants could express their ideas, views on the national
subsidy for obstetric care and relationships in the health
centre. The transcript of focus groups was written in
French.
Analysis of documents
Twenty-three documents (maternal death audits, guide-
lines, management sheets, register of birth, ethnography)
were screened and analyzed to better understand the
history of this maternal health policy and the context in
which it was implemented [28].
Observations
Non-participant observations were conducted in each
health centre (N = 6) to examine the interactional aspects
between health workers and communities and assess how
these interactions influence the implementation process.
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immersion in the field (4 months) by the first author was
undertaken to understand the social context of the study.
The first author conducted the observations in each health
centre, spending 7 to 10 days at each health centre. The
second author, who has worked in this area of research for
12 years, has in-depth knowledge of this maternal health
policy.Feedback session on the findings
Preliminary results were presented and discussed with
the members of district management and 20 health
workers in the district in February 2011 in the presence
of the two authors. Work groups were organized, and
the participants were asked about their perceptions of
the results, whether they agreed or disagreed with the
findings of the study, and their ideas on how to improve
the efficiency of this maternal health policy. The whole
session was recorded and transcribed. Several authors
have reported that sharing the results of a study with
stakeholders and allowing them to participate in the
evaluation process is very beneficial for understanding
the phenomenon under study and finding solutions to
improve the effectiveness of the intervention [13].Data analysis
All interviews and notes were transcribed and codified
with the qualitative software QDA Miner. A thematic
approach was used [29]. A list of themes (subsidy, trans-
portation, quality of care, monitoring, effects) was drawn
up, based on the logic model (Figure 1), the objectives of
the study and observations from the field. Each inter-
view was codified according to these themes in order to
observe the similarities, contrasts and outliers of what
was said for each theme [29].Ethical considerations
The health research ethics committees of the Ministry of
Health of Burkina Faso (no. 2010–072) and the Univer-
sity of Montreal (CRCHUM) approved the study
(10.178). Authorization (2010 06 04 MS-RSHL-DRS)
was given by the direction of the health region in the
Sahel to conduct the study. The anonymity of partici-
pants was maintained throughout the study. Informed
consent was obtained from the participants.Results
Results will be presented as follows: the study site, per-
ceptions of the health policy (content and implementa-
tion), the implementation process, and the interactional
factors that were found to have an influence on this ma-
ternal health policy.Study site
This district with 390.000 residents is located in the
province of Soum in Burkina Faso [30].
Composed of rural departments, it is one of the poor-
est regions in Burkina Faso. The 193 villages in this re-
gion are unevenly distributed. There are 31 health
centres (one per 12.500 people vs. a national average of
one per 10.000) and one district hospital. Twenty-seven
health centres do not meet infrastructure standards and
10% of health centres do not meet human resource stan-
dards [30]. The average distance between villages and
health centres is estimated at 11.4 km [30]. In 2009, the
rate of assisted delivery was estimated at 53.2% [30].
Perceptions of the health policy
Health workers welcomed this national health policy.
First, they see it as a good strategy for improving access
to health care, both to increase the rate of antenatal care
and as an opportunity to further extend the intended
results into other areas, such as a higher vaccination
rate. However, health staff stated that this national
health policy should cover the whole process of preg-
nancy, not only the delivery, in order to prevent compli-
cations. They indicated that they are aware that this
national health policy is not enough to effectively de-
crease maternal mortality. From their perspective, other
measures should be added. Comment from a district
health manager: “This health policy alone cannot meet
the challenges of access to health care. We need to reduce
distances between villages and health centres, and
change people’s behaviour.”
The implementation process was perceived to be diffi-
cult because the guidelines were not clear in terms of
targets, extension (period of time) and drugs covered by
the policy. Therefore, at the beginning of the implemen-
tation there was some variation in the understanding of
the national policy, as noted by a nurse: “Everybody is
doing it his own way.” (health centre 5).
Implementation
The implementation analysis section was described accord-
ing to the components of the health policy (Figure 1). For
each component, the congruency of what was planned,
what was implemented as per official records, and what
was actually done as reported by participants was
examined.
The reimbursement system
According to the policy guidelines, health centres can be
reimbursed for two types of assisted deliveries: normal
deliveries (no complications) and complicated deliveries
(dystocic labour). For normal labour, health centres were
reimbursed 3600 CFA (5.5 Euro) for each delivery per-
formed. For complicated deliveries, health centres were
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trict health manager, the rate of dystocic labour in health
centres has doubled since the beginning of the imple-
mentation of this health policy. To reduce these costs,
the health district manager ordered staff to stop writing
dystocic labour on the reimbursement sheet. Therefore,
health centres are reimbursed only for uncomplicated
deliveries. “They re-defined dystocia for us. It is not the
dystocia that we learnt at medical school. Money is
involved in that” (nurse, health centre 4). “We are told
not to do any more dystocia labour. However, in health
centres we deal with dystocia labour” (nurse, health
centre 2).
Two years after the launch of the policy, the reim-
bursement system was changed. Since 2009, health cen-
tres are no longer reimbursed at a fixed rate, but on the
basis of actual expenses. Reimbursement sheets for the
policy were consulted in the 6 health centres that were
studied. The cost of normal deliveries ranged from 1200
to 1500 CFA (2 to 2.3 Euro) in health centres. Health
district managers perceived the national level estimate of
the cost of a normal delivery as being too high. Changes
in the modalities of reimbursement in health centres
were key turning points in the implementation of this
health policy. According to the district managers, health
workers asked for reimbursement of dystocic labour in
order to have higher refund payments and a more gener-
ous budget: “We found that it was for a greater balance.”
The estimated cost per patient for a caesarean section,
as planned in the policy, was 11.000 CFA (17 Euro). In
2008, health district managers decided to pay 5000 CFA
(7.6 Euro) of this cost by drawing on the budget line for
drugs provided by the state. In 2009, the remaining 6000
CFA (9 Euro) was paid by each COGES each month.
Therefore, parturients do not pay for caesarean sections
(which cost 11.000 CFA). This initiative came into effect
in July 2010 and the impact remains to be studied.
The grant for the worst-off
The policy planned to fully exempt the poorest patients
from all costs associated with assisted deliveries and
emergency obstetric care [22]. A budget from the na-
tional subsidy obstetric care policy of 50000 million CFA
(76.2 million Euro) was planned to fund the poorest
patients. In the district of Djibo the subsidy for the
worst-off was not implemented. “The application is very
hard, starting with the definition: what is a worst-off?”
“Which criteria should we use to say that this person is a
worst-off and this one is not?” (district health manager).
Transportation
The cost of transportation between a health centre and
the district hospital is covered by the policy. The trans-
portation funding was supposed to be managedseparately from the budget for deliveries and emergency
obstetric care. The main problem perceived by the dis-
trict is the long delay in reimbursement for transporta-
tion from health centres to the district hospital. The
outstanding amount, supported by the district hospital,
is estimated at 6 million CFA (91.500 Euro). According
to the health district managers, this is leading to finan-
cial difficulties. The delay is due to misunderstanding
the process of reimbursement by the district health man-
ager. The district health manager does not keep receipts
from the purchase of gasoline; however, this ticket is the
basis on which the reimbursement is made.
The district of Djibo covers an area of 12.700 km2
[30]. Only one ambulance is functional for the whole
district, which leads to significant delays in referrals, as
outlined by one health worker: “You can call for the am-
bulance and find that it is elsewhere, so you must wait
for the ambulance to come back out. It is a real problem”
(health centre 3). The ambulance is used frequently and
it is a multi-purpose pick-up vehicle, which is also used
for other emergency transportation.
Quality of care
The implementation guidelines for this policy recom-
mend improving the quality of care [22]. The quality of
care component in the guidelines was composed of vari-
ous activities, such as continuity in conducting maternal
death audits, and the implementation of a quality assur-
ance service (QAS) team in the district hospital in
charge of safety and enforcement of hygiene standards.
Health workers are supposed to conduct surveys of
patients to assess quality of care in health centres. For
each delivery, health staff is supposed to use a parto-
graph to assess the process of delivery. Health workers
are informed and trained to write maternal death audits,
these audits are carried out in the district of Djibo, and
the records of these were available for study. Sessions to
discuss maternal death audits were organized at the dis-
trict hospital. However, the surveys of the beneficiary
population and the QAS team were not implemented.
“In our health centre we did not implement these activ-
ities. The survey that we should do, we learnt that from
you [the researcher]. They did not give us any guidelines
or document that talks about that” (nurse at health
centre 1).
In health centres where there are no midwives or
skilled birth attendants, the partograph is not used.
These centres represent 13.3% of health centres in the
district of Djibo [30]. Problems using the partograph
reported by health workers are related to both social
context and working conditions in health centres. The
patients often come to the health centre when they are
fully dilated or in the expulsion phase of labour, while
the start of writing a partograph should begin at four
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ant (health centre 1): “Women usually come to the health
centre when they are about to give birth. It is then diffi-
cult to open a partograph to monitor.” The lack of infra-
structures (no electricity) also makes using partographs
difficult. A skilled birth attendant said that she stopped
opening partographs because she refused to work with a
flashlight (health facility 1); 24% of health centres do not
have electricity [30].
Supplies and equipment
One of the key components of the policy guidelines is to
make drugs and supplies available for performing deliveries.
Although there have not been any significant disruptions in
drugs and supplies, items are not sufficiently available in
the delivery room, as indicated by a midwife: “In health cen-
tres there were no gloves for revision [of the uterus], while
you are often asked to make revisions, you are forced to tin-
ker” (Health centre 6). In addition, equipment such as birth
boxes and delivery tables is limited and heavily used, result-
ing in problems with providing good quality care. As a
health district manager has indicated: “the material is not
enough. This material wears out quickly.”
Incentive measures
The policy as planned did not provide a specific incentive
system for health workers in addition to the usual (20%
bonus per procedure). The system of bonuses was added
later in the district with the approval of the central level:
“Health workers thought that this policy came as a huge
work load. They asked for a financial motivation for this
policy. But it is written nowhere. We asked the central
level, and we were told that is only on the medical act that
you can take 20% bonus” (district manager). In the district
of Djibo, this system is applied differently from one health
centre to another. Some health centres have applied this
20% bonus only to medical procedures. Others have ap-
plied it to the contribution of the patients, and others have
not applied it at all. According to health workers, this pol-
icy should have been planned to offer a formal financial
incentive measure to encourage them in their work in
addition to the 20% bonus.
Communication
In the district of Djibo, the process of informing the
population of this health policy was vertical. The infor-
mation came first to the district health manager and
went through health workers, the local political commu-
nity and finally to the communities. The main commu-
nication channels that were used were antenatal care
consultations, routine vaccinations in villages, and the
radio. However, many women were still not informed of
this health policy: “We did not know that the price ofdeliveries has changed. Nobody came to our village to tell
us that” (women’s focus group, health centre 1).
Monitoring system
Health workers have to fill in two documents related to
this policy: individual patient records and the birth regis-
try. At the beginning of the implementation, health
workers had problems completing the individual patient
record. “Filling forms was a real problem because we did
not understand some elements of the form to fill prop-
erly” (nurse at health centre 3).
Document storage and entering the data in the elec-
tronic database mandated by the policy were the main
administrative problems perceived by district health
managers. The absence of an archiving system and the
lack of space in the district caused more problems with
storing all the reimbursement sheets for the 31 health
centres that reach the district each month, as outlined
by a health district manager: “This policy has reiterated
the problem of archiving in the district.” There can be as
many as 60 record sheets each month for a busy health
centre.
The database software came one year after the imple-
mentation of the policy, creating a great delay in enter-
ing data in the database. In addition, the software is only
available on one computer and cannot be duplicated on
others. To overcome this problem, the health district
manager hired a secretary from the district’s own budget
to perform data entry. During the period of data collec-
tion for our study (November 2010), she was entering
data from November 2009.
Interactional factors
In this section, interactions between groups of participants
at the community level were identified as having an influ-
ence on the implementation process, relation between
patients and providers, health workers and TBAs, health
workers and members of COGES. Poor relations between
these groups may reduce the effectiveness of this policy.
An ambivalent relationship between health workers
and patients
The implementation of this policy influences relations
between health workers and patients. On the one hand,
health workers perceived an improvement in relations,
because they no longer have to negotiate medical costs
with their patients. On the other hand, the misunder-
standing surrounding the items covered by the policy
leads to strained relations: “The villager is what he is; he
thinks that everything is free.”(nurse, health centre 1)
“When patients come and there is nothing to pay, the at-
mosphere is more relaxed.” (district manager).
However, some communities have not observed any
changes in relations with health workers. In some
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care, whereas in others relations with their health work-
ers are perceived as more negative. Informal payments,
the rate of absenteeism, the unavailability of health
workers, and the expression of authority over patients
are the main issues highlighted by communities: “When
you go to pay for drugs at the pharmacy, they cheat all
your money. I have had to pay drugs out there that rose
from 35.000 (53.3 Euro) to 50.000 CFA”(76.2 Euro). “The
skilled birth attendant did not assist me to deliver, she
came when I had already delivered”(health centre 1).
Another women indicated: “I decided not to go to the
health centre to give birth because when we went for my
co-wife, nobody was there to take care of her” (health
centre 2). Another woman reported: “When you do
something that did not fit, she [the skilled birth attend-
ant] scolds you” (health centre 1).
Traditional birth attendants and community health workers:
forgotten by the policy
The national subsidy for obstetric care as planned did not
involve traditional birth attendants, who had no assigned
role under this national health policy. However, a decree
from the Ministry of Health issued in December 2007
requires districts to redirect the role of TBAs [26]. Their
role was shifted without any change in compensation.
Nowadays, TBAs are asked to encourage women to attend
health centres. Health workers and district managers have
ambivalent perceptions of the role of TBAs and CHWs.
On the one hand, they are seen as an obstacle to the pol-
icy because they continue to perform deliveries in villages
against the aim of the policy. On the other hand, they are
considered a potential ally to help with activities: “Their
presence is an advantage but also an inconvenience. They
make our life difficult.” (district health manager).
From the perspective of TBAs, they understand their
new role but feel frustrated that they are not sufficiently
involved in the activities of health centres. Moreover, as
the new policy has transferred their former role of assist-
ing during delivery to the health centre, this also means
a loss of income for TBAs. “My new role is good. Before
we did not go to health centres and many women died
after delivery, but since we started to go there is no ma-
ternal death but health workers do not invite me to their
meetings. They did not give us anything (money).” (TBA,
health centre 2).
The perspective of CHWs is similar to that of TBAs.
They feel useless and excluded from the activities of the
health centre.
Relations between COGES and health workers:
allies or enemies?
COGES play an important role in the implementation of
the policy. Grant reimbursements are made from thedistrict directly to their bank account. They are required
to bear the costs until they receive the subsidy payments.
Health workers perceive a lack of cooperation from
these agents in the activities of the health centre, such as
paying for gas to go to villages to raise awareness.
According to health workers, COGES do not perform
their role as an interface between the health centre and
the community, for example in transmitting information.
Problems in understanding the process of reimburse-
ment lead to strained relations: “They do not understand
the modality of reimbursement, so when we ask them to
pay for medication we have to negotiate with them.”
(nurse, health centre 3).
From the perspective of COGES, the long delay in re-
imbursement is the main difficulty perceived in the im-
plementation of this national health policy, leading to
the purchase of drugs on credit. Only one of the COGES
members interviewed talked about negative relations be-
tween them and health workers, as stated by a COGES
president: “Most of the time the relationship doesn’t
work. There is a lack of collaboration between health
workers and us.” (health centre 2).Discussion
Implementers have a positive perception of the content
of this health policy. The lack of clarity in the guidelines
has made the implementation of the policy difficult. The
storage of documents, entering information in the data-
base, problems with using the partograph, and the lim-
ited number of ambulances were the principal
challenges faced by implementers. All the activities
were implemented except for the grant for the worst-off
and some activities related to quality of care. Inter-
actional factors, such as relations between patients and
providers and between health workers and communities,
were raised.A fairly effective implementation, except for the lack of
involvement of traditional birth attendants
In the context of improving financial access to health
care, five issues surrounding the implementation process
were raised: adequate funding, involving front-line work-
ers in the decision-making process, providing incentive
measures, improving the communications strategy, and
quality of care [9,20,31]. In the district of Djibo, al-
though reimbursement was estimated at a fixed rate,
funding was adequate. Information on this health policy
was provided vertically and in an executive manner. In-
centive measures were partially implemented in health
centres, with some but not all health centres establishing
a bonus system. A lack of clarification on the way to cal-
culate this bonus led to various payments. Although
health workers perceived an improvement in provider-
Belaid and Ridde BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth 2012, 12:143 Page 9 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2393/12/143patient relations, the quality of care remains unchanged
(Table 2).
The lack of involvement of traditional birth attendants
and community health workers and their impact on the
policy is an additional finding of this study. Both were
negatively affected by the policy. Findings in this study
are similar to research in Ghana, where 60% of TBAs felt
that the policy of eliminating user fees has taken away
their clients and caused them to lose part of their in-
come [32]. Although they are no longer in charge of the
health of the community, they do still play a role in the
community and can influence the population, especially
when they are present in villages that are far away from
health centres [32-34]. Indeed, information on health
care activities, such as vaccination campaigns, vitamin A
supplement campaigns, antenatal care and new health
policies is transmitted through them to the population.
In this sense, they have a direct influence on the process
of implementation and the effects of the policy. Informing
the population is one of the new tasks that were assigned
to them. Because there is currently little evidence that
their biomedical training as birth attendants is sufficient
to allow them to reduce maternal mortality when per-
forming their traditional role, their new role and their im-
pact on maternal health are still being discussed [33,34].
Moreover, little information is available on the correlation
between the role of TBAs and policies designed to im-
prove assisted deliveries. More studies are needed to bet-
ter understand the relationship between TBAs and the
policy of eliminating user fees for health services.
The benefits of evaluating the implementation process
Literature on the impact of fee removal policies on ser-
vice utilization and out-of-pocket expenditures is grow-
ing [35-39]. However, implementation analysis is still
scarce, specifically at the micro level, in the context ofTable 2 A fairly efficient implementation except for the lack o
Issues District of
Djibo
Adequate funding Yes Funding cov
reimbursem
Involving front line workers No Lack of invo
of informatio













Involving Traditional birth attendants and
community health workers
No Lack of invo
them
Making feed back session results with
stakeholders
Yes Work groups
strategies toimproving financial access to maternal care [6]. Yet it is
essential for decision-makers who set up this type of pol-
icy, because it highlights barriers that counteract the im-
plementation of such policies [12,13]. In the case of this
study, implementation evaluation has identified the chal-
lenges that implementers face, such as problem with
using the software for data entry, resulting in long delays
in reimbursement.
In addition, implementation evaluation helps us to see
the congruency between the planned and actual imple-
mented intervention and understand the gap between
the two [12]. In the case of this health policy, no great
“implementation gap” was observed, except for the sub-
sidy for the worst-off and for some activities related to
quality of care [39]. Therefore, in the case of this policy,
subsidies for the worst-off and improving quality of care
should be targeted.
Power relations within the implementation process
Screening interactional factors has led us to deeply exam-
ine micro interactions between participants in health-care
settings. Analysis has shown the complexity of relation-
ships between different groups of participants. One of the
major findings is the daily practice of power by the people
involved. As Walt (1994) stated, analyzing the implemen-
tation of health policies involves taking power relations
into consideration [40]. Moreover, “it is the sharp end of
much health policy implementation,” because it can mod-
ify the implementation process and may have an impact
on the effects of a policy in reducing or enhancing the ef-
fectiveness of the policy [11]. In the case of this study,
power relations were detected at 3 levels.
District health managers and health workers
According to Erasmus and Gilson (2008), the practice of
power by central agents can be exercised by “controllingf involvement of TBAs
Empirical data
ers the expenses of assisted deliveries, no difficulties in the
ent system was perceived by district managers
lvement of health workers in the district, vertical process of transmission
n, execution implementation
the application of the incentive measures, 3/6 of health centres have
incentive measure
ess: from district to health centres to communities. Channels: prenatal
tion sites, radio
ments, rate of absenteeism, health workers not available
lvement of TBAs, excluded from this national policy, loss of income for
organized, discussion of the results, perceptions of the findings,
improve the policy
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needs” [11]. In this study, district health managers con-
trol front-line workers. The balance of power between
these two groups shows a marked distinction of roles
and tasks. Front-line workers perceived themselves as
mere performers. By contrast, district health manager
teams see themselves as “supervisors” or “controllers.”
The terms “control,” “monitor” and “supervision” were
used repeatedly to describe relations with health work-
ers. These types of power relations emphasize the “top-
down model” of implementation, where individuals in
the upper level in the health system exercise their power
based on authority given to them [11]. The implementa-
tion process for the health policy is done in a vertical
process, where health workers are not involved in the
decision-making process. In addition, health workers felt
a lack of recognition from their superiors. This feeling
leads to a crystallization of the relationship between
these two groups of participants. Therefore, this type of
power based on formal authority and hierarchy is known
in organizations and institutions in low-income coun-
tries [41]. This type of power is rooted in the institu-
tional culture of these settings [41,42]. In the context of
implementing health policy, the question that we should
ask is how to manage these structural relations of power.
Although the agents in the upper sphere can use their
power, the street-level workers who are at the bottom of
the decision-making process also have discretionary
power that they can exercise and thereby change the im-
plementation process [43]. The discretionary power of
health workers may be one of the reasons why the na-
tional subsidy of obstetric care failed to achieve its
objectives [43].
COGES and health workers
In some health centres, COGES work and collaborate
positively with health workers, but in most centres, the
relationship is adversarial [44,45]. The central issue be-
tween the two groups of agents is the financial manage-
ment of the health centre. The responsibilities of
COGES have remained unchanged since the application
of the Initiative of Bamako (IB). Financial management
of this health policy has been added. Indeed, the refund
policy is made directly from the district to the COGES
bank account. Patients’ contribution is paid directly into
their bank account and contributes to the purchase of
drugs and supplies. Conflicts were palpable when it
came to disbursing money for health centre expenses, as
was the case even before the policy [15,44,45]. This find-
ing is similar to two studies carried out in Mali and
Senegal [15,44]. The difficulty of collaboration between
COGES and health staff and the lack of transparency in
the financial management of the health centre were
highlighted in both studies. Power relations within thecommunities may weaken collaboration between the two
groups of participants. In this research, misunderstand-
ing of the reimbursement process outlined by the health
policy enhances conflicts.
Providers and patients
The impact of provider-patient relations on the use of
maternal health services in low-income countries has
been documented [46-49]. It is not only an important
factor in the choice to use maternal health services, but
also a fundamental criterion for improving quality of
care. In the context of policies mandating the elimin-
ation of user fees, relations between the provider and
the patient remained unchanged [9,31,50], marked by
the existence of informal payments demanded by health
workers and misunderstanding of the policy [9,51]. This
study supports this finding. Although health workers
have seen an improvement in relations in the sense that
they have no longer have to negotiate the payment of
medical drugs, informal payments still exist. High rates
of absenteeism for health workers in health centres and
their unavailability and the expression of authority to-
wards patients are “routine practice” in daily health care.
According to Gilson and Erasmus, “these routine prac-
tices” could be considered forms of power by health
workers over patients [11]. These power relations seem
inherent in the health system, specifically in low-income
countries. Therefore, in the context of implementing
health policy, these power relations within the health
system should be discussed.
Limitations of the study
This study is one of the few research that analyze the
implementation process for public health care policy at
the micro level in the context of reducing the financial
costs of maternal health care. The study was limited to
one district due to budget and time constraints. It is ob-
viously impossible to generalize the results to the whole
country. However, the objective of this study is not to
make statistical inferences but to try to understand in
depth how this maternal health policy was implemented
in six health centres. In this sense, the heuristic value of
the contrasted cases (health centres) was the priority.
The findings of this study are similar to findings from
other districts and other countries [32]. Therefore, these
similarities lead to a “theoretical generalization” about
the phenomenon under study [12].
Conclusions
Removing user fees for health care is an ambitious polit-
ical policy. The impact of this type of policy on service
utilization and out-of-pocket expenditures is becoming
well known. However, implementation evaluation is still
scarce. This article contributes to our understanding of
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the challenges faced by implementers and provides an
overview of how this maternal health policy was imple-
mented and why it was done in this way. The “imple-
mentation gap" analysis has shown that equity and
quality of care were neglected and should be taken into
consideration. Moreover, it raises interactional factors
that have an influence on the process of implementation.
This study has shown the importance of considering
power relations between actors representing health sys-
tem and communities. While power relations have been
recognized as a key factor in health policy analysis, ex-
plicit analysis is still scarce. In the context of improving
financial access to maternal health care, more studies
should be encouraged to examine power relations within
the implementation process.
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